U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Boston Police Department

Enhancing Cultures of Integrity

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE

COPS
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Enhancing Cultures of Integrity

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE

April 2010

LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR

Dear Colleague,

The COPS Office longstanding commitment to strengthening police-citizen partnerships has resulted in significant changes in policies and procedures among the local law enforcement agencies. This commitment has also produced a variety of resources on police integrity and ethics that includes, but is not limited to, the leadership and supervisory training, biased-based policing, effective use of early intervention systems, internal affairs, less than lethal technology, and use of force resources.

The COPS Office seeks to create community policing environments that develop or improve trust and mutual respect between law enforcement and their communities and ensure equal treatment for all citizens. The overriding goal of the COPS Police Integrity Initiative is to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies by strengthening climates of trust, cooperation, and partnership between police and their communities. Past and ongoing strategies to achieve this objective include developing best practices and model problem-solving partnerships, information dissemination, and national training on important issues related to police integrity.

This report is a technical assistance guide by the Boston Police Department that was prepared as a requirement of the Enhancing Cultures of Integrity competitive grant program, and was developed to share the successes and challenges as well as lessons learned with the COPS Office and other law enforcement agencies.

The COPS Office understands the importance of learning from the experience of others. It is in this spirit that we are pleased to share this report. We hope you will find this publication helpful in your local efforts, and we encourage you to share this publication, as well as your successes with other law enforcement practitioners.

Sincerely,



Bernard Melekian
Director

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The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of this publication. Given that URLs and web sites are in constant flux, neither the authors nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past 15 years, the Boston Police Department (BPD) has planned and implemented a community policing strategy that relies heavily on maintaining accountability to the community. Through a series of partnerships with the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) during this period, the BPD has made important progress in building and enhancing its integrity, a concept that is integral in maintaining the community's trust. This commitment to continually enhancing the department's integrity and accountability to the community is the foundation of the department's community policing process, and is integral to every aspect of the department's work.

BPD's historic partnerships with the COPS office, including its selection as an Enhancing Cultures of Integrity program site goes back to the establishment of the COPS Office in 1994. At that time, COPS was a foundational partner in the comprehensive, long-term planning process in Boston that was the key to the successful implementation of community policing. During that time, then Police Commissioner Paul Evans formed neighborhood-based strategic planning teams that brought together 400 key stakeholders—half of them community residents and leaders, and half BPD sworn personnel—to define the values, mission, and goals of community policing (or neighborhood policing) in Boston. This process enabled the department to make a major breakthrough in its relations with the community. Further, the process both compelled and facilitated a fundamental reorientation of the mission. The department shifted from having a predominantly internal orientation that was driven and measured by benchmarks such as response time, to embracing an external orientation that is measured by assessing the level of community safety and citizen satisfaction.

The key to building and maintaining a high level of performance in the community policing arena over time has been BPD's ongoing commitment to a continual evaluation and further development of its core values and integrity. It is in this spirit that the department embraced seven strategies for enhancing its culture of integrity under this most recent grant-based partnership with the COPS Office. While work on these strategies has taken place during a particularly challenging time for the Boston Police Department (two changes in leadership as well as a sharp increase in the crime rate), the department has accomplished many milestones under this program. In the process, we have learned a great deal that will hopefully be of interest and use to other departments.

BACKGROUND

Over the last 5 to 10 years, research on police integrity and accountability has begun to move away from an individualistic approach to screening out "bad apples" and toward an emphasis on building systems within departments that continually reinforce a culture of integrity by reflecting core values in daily processes. Specifically, recent research concludes that "law enforcement agencies may find adopting the view that integrity is an organizational or occupational responsibility is more effective then emphasizing personal ethics or morality."[1] Given these findings, under the "Enhancing Cultures of Integrity" (ECI) program, BPD chose seven key strategies for enhancing accountability and the culture of integrity that focus on increasing the core operational processes such as intelligence collection and citizen complaint review processes to more acutely reflect an emphasis on accountability. The department selected the following strategies:

1 *Enhancing Police Integrity,* NCJ 209269, December 2005, NIJ Report, Carl B. Klockars, Ph.D.; Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Ph.D.; and Maria Haberfeld, Ph.D.

- Self-Assessment Techniques for Internal Monitoring
- Improving Citizen Complaint Processes
- Ensuring Accountability to the Community on Special Events Planning and Intelligence Collection
- Enhancing Command Staff Integrity Training
- Review and Enhancement of Use of Force Policy and Training
- Increasing Diversity in Recruitment Initiative
- Transition Team Focus Groups.

While each of these strategies had been addressed in some fashion under previous community policing initiatives, as part of the ongoing effort to continually improve and reflect, the department chose to take a second look at these specific areas with the hopes of enhancing and improving the processes in place.

Strategy 1: Self-Assessment Techniques for Internal Monitoring

The Boston Police Department set out to develop and pilot a decision-making audit system under the first strategy, based on a system created in Northern Ireland. The BPD variation of the this system was envisioned to be one that would enable officers to document and track agency decisions as well as to monitor potential police integrity issues in three particularly sensitive areas of police operations.

1. Internal affairs investigations
2. Hate crime investigations (in conjunction with the Community Disorders Unit)
3. Special event planning and implementation (specifically, the 2004 Democratic National Convention).

This strategy was selected because the BPD believed it would enhance accountability and generally improve decision-making processes within the department, as it would require officers to record and assume direct responsibility for policing decisions in many key areas. These areas include: developing lines of inquiry; conducting interviews; managing searches; determining forensic strategies; making arrests; leveling charges; communicating with the media; and interacting with family liaisons.

Strategy 2: Improving Citizen Complaint Processes

The BPD set out to examine its policies and practices regarding the management of citizen complaints with the belief that an improved citizen complaint process would:

1. Help police conduct internal investigations by enhancing the quality of information available.
2. Support mutual respect between the police and the public.
3. Deepen police legitimacy in Boston neighborhoods (particularly in communities of color that have been at odds with police, historically).

Further, BPD hoped that by demonstrating its commitment to the citizen complaint process, it would engender stronger community/police ties ultimately aiding the department to locate and apprehend dangerous offenders living in Boston neighborhoods.

Under this strategy, the department envisioned a research and policy-revision process that would have three parts:

1. Partnering with Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice and an auditor recommended by the Department of Justice to complete a review of the current intake process with particular attention paid to the accessibility of complaint-filing venues and the quality of service in complaint-filing venues (including speed of processing and officer courtesy/cooperation). Consultants were identified who would be available to gather data by visiting station houses around Boston, lodging "test" complaints, and observing police responses.
2. Examining citizens' perspectives on the investigative process post-intake with a specific focus on the nature and frequency of police updates on case progress and the communication of case outcomes. This section of the plan also called for consultants to collect this information by interviewing a group of complainants and following the resolution of their cases.
3. Examining the data collected by consultants and adjusting the department's policies to more completely accommodate the public's needs and concerns in this area of police operations. The BPD planned to codify any changes deemed necessary in a new rule and procedure and to distribute this rule to all BDP personnel. Senior command officers were prepared to conduct roll-call visits to ensure that department staff understood and

supported the new policies. With the help and guidance of civil rights and civil liberties organizations in the Boston area, the BPD also planned to conduct a community education campaign to provide general information about the complaint filing process and to inform the public of policy changes.

Strategy 3: Ensuring Accountability to the Community on Special Events Planning and Intelligence Collection

The 2004 Democratic National Convention was to be the first national nominating convention following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Consequently, significant police planning and involvement to ensure safe outcomes for all participants and city residents was required. The BPD believed that intelligence gathering would be an essential part of securing this event. However, complicating the planning of police strategy for the event was the possible intersection of best police procedure and the civil rights of political demonstrators attending the event. Considering the potential friction this intersection could cause, the department decided to plan their strategy for the event very carefully.

The BPD also realized that intelligence-gathering procedures put in place for a one-time event could significantly impact police-community relationships over the long term. By its nature, intelligence gathering requires a degree of confidentiality that some citizens may question or interpret as unwarranted police secrecy. The department hoped to dispel any community concerns about the confidential nature of intelligence gathering by involving key community groups and civil rights experts in crafting the intelligence collection procedural guidelines. Specifically, the BPD sought to:

- Protect mutual trust and respect between the police and the community
- Maintain the public's belief in the police's good-faith use of intelligence
- Uphold the Constitutional rights of all parties.

The BPD also hoped that these intelligence-gathering guidelines would help support police practice and community connections into the future.

In preparation for the 2004 Democratic National Convention, the BPD set out to develop intelligence-gathering procedures that would help identify individuals with criminal intentions, protect official participants, and simultaneously ensure dissenters' civil liberties. Recognizing the complexities of this policing process, the BPD hoped to learn from other departments across the nation that had hosted national events in recent years particularly, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, New York City, Seattle, Salt Lake City, and Washington, D.C. The BPD planned to interview police personnel in all of these cities and to determine how each department had handled the information-gathering process before and during their respective events. The BPD also hoped to learn how other departments had parlayed their efforts, balancing public security and civil rights into daily policing practice.

The BPD planned to use this information to create a draft policy, outlining Boston police practice concerning intelligence gathering. Hoping to involve the community in this development process, the BPD decided to invite civil rights leaders and other community-based partners to review the draft policy and contribute to its revision. The BPD then planned to develop and deliver training on the new policy to all relevant personnel, as well as engage evaluators from Northeastern University to assess police practice during the convention.

Strategy 4: Adaptation of Command Staff Integrity Training

The BPD, in partnership with the Regional Community Policing Institute of New England (RCPI/NE), planned to adapt four existing workshops—focusing on key issues in police leadership, ethics, and integrity—to meet the needs of a new audience, namely lieutenants, sergeants, and detectives. The RCPI/NE agreed to deliver the following trainings:

- Citizen Complaint Intake and Investigation Issues
- Early Identification and Intervention Systems
- Racial Profiling: Issues and Dilemmas
- Use of Force Issues in a Community Policing Environment.

All of these professional development modules were to include an instructor's guide, a participant's guide, and a collection of related resource materials. The trainings, themselves, were to engage participants in an interactive learning experience, involving facilitated discussions, small-group work, and case analyses.

BPD chose this strategy because by offering the training modules (originally developed for chiefs and senior managers) to lieutenants, sergeants, and detectives, the BPD hoped to provide additional staff members with information and strategies to manage ethically challenging situations in the field. The department believed that this training series would enable first-line personnel to make better decisions in key moments and consequently secure safer outcomes for citizens and police.

Strategy 5: Review and Enhancement of Use of Force Policy and Training

The BPD planned to deliver 1-day training sessions to police chiefs and senior managers on the complexities and responsibilities associated with using force in the line of duty. The proposed training model would employ case studies to help participants:

- Engage their beliefs and experiences about using force
- Examine and discuss police accountability in the field
- Study the impact of using force on community/police relations
- Consider the relationship between use of force issues and police integrity/leadership.

The BPD hoped that the training would also enable participants to examine personal attitudes and practices regarding using force. Through this personal examination, it was anticipated that participants would identify any steps that they or their colleagues might need to take to ensure a uniform understanding of the policies and complexities associated with the use of force within the department.

The department undertook this strategy because it needed to provide police executives and command staff with the resources and information they would need to set and manage large-scale citywide and national events.

Strategy 6: Recruitment Initiative

Faced with both the lowest number of applicants citywide in 8 years, and a lack of diversity in the pool of applicants, in 2006 the Boston Police Department decided to take a community partnership approach to the problem of police recruitment. The result was a phased initiative designed to increase the applicant pool and diversity within that pool, while simultaneously cultivating police-community partnerships. The recruitment initiative not only utilized community input to ascertain the types of values and qualifications the community finds desirable in good police officer, but through the partnership of police and the community, the scope of recruiting was expanded to reach much more of the spectrum of Boston's diverse communities. Through this partnership BPD hoped that the recruitment process would improve community perception of police integrity and transparency while simultaneously cultivating a force reflective of the existing diversity of the population of Boston. The phases of the recruitment initiative were as follows:

- **Phase I:** Commander of Recruit Investigations develops preliminary recruitment strategy; forms a recruitment committee
- **Phase II:** Marketing Campaign
  - Traditional and Nontraditional Methods
- **Phase III:** Developing Police-Community Partnership
- **Phase IV:** Strategic Planning Process
- **Phase V:** Preliminary Assessment.

The department adopted the recruitment initiative as an integrity enhancement strategy in order to attract recruits who not only would meet the objective physical, tactical, and academic requirements necessary to become a Boston police officer, but would also reflect the diversity of the city of Boston. Through increased diversity in the force, the hope was that community members would perceive the police as more connected to their neighborhoods, thereby augmenting the level of integrity the police are perceived to have. By collaborating with key community stakeholders and groups on the development and implementation of the recruitment initiative, BPD was also able to put community policing philosophies into action and strengthen the partnership between the police and the community.

Strategy 7: Transition Team Focus Groups

In order to facilitate the change in administration of the department from former commissioner Kathleen O'Toole to the current commissioner, Edward F. Davis, the Office of the Police Commissioner partnered with consultant Dr. Brenda Bond to form Transition Team Focus Groups. The strategy allowed volunteers from both the civilian staff and sworn officers to join a transition team charged with the task of reviewing and discussing the ways the department could improve its functioning. Researchers compiled a list of all departmental areas of improvement or themes that had been consistently identified through various BPD conversations, planning sessions, and retreats since 1999 for review. Eleven focus groups were then formed out of the 119 BPD employees, and officers who volunteered to be a part of the Transition Team were then charged with the task of reviewing the list of areas of improvement, prioritizing those areas in terms of which deserved the most urgent attention, and then brainstorming the internal and external barriers that existed to implementing change.

The Transition Team Focus Groups served as a tool to initiate an environment of open discourse under the new administration of Commissioner Davis. The department's policies and procedures became more transparent through dialog concerning their effectiveness and important input from staff regarding ways in which change can occur. The prioritization of areas for improvement also helps create a system of accountability within the department that will then translate to an increased perception by the public that police procedure is standardized and unbiased.

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

Strategy 1: Self-Assessment Techniques for Internal Monitoring

Focus of Strategy

The Boston Police Department proposed developing and piloting an internal monitoring system that would enable officers to document and track agency decisions, as well as potential police integrity issues in three areas of police operations. These areas include: internal affairs investigations; hate crime investigations (as part of the Community Disorders Unit); and special event planning and implementation, specifically as related to the management of the 2004 Democratic National Convention. The original plan under this strategy called for utilization of a decision-making audit system used in Northern Ireland to enhance decision-making for investigations and operations as a model. Senior BPD command staff members, including the chief of the Bureau of Professional Development, met twice with Chief Constable Hugh Orde of the Police Services of Northern Ireland—once in Boston and once in Belfast. At the time, these senior commanders felt the system used in Northern Ireland had tremendous potential for application in Boston. In addition, Chief Inspector Jonathan Kearney, staff officer to Chief Constable Orde, had agreed to serve as a long-distance, pro bono adviser on the project.

This strategy was embraced because at the time the Boston Police Department had no system to track and analyze the sequence of decisions made by investigators or operations/special event commanders. Focusing on this strategy has allowed BPD to further research and assess established systems of documenting key decisions in an effort to improve the organization's internal decision-making process. Specifically, BPD has been looking at systems that have the capacity to capture, track, and analyze key decision points such as forensic strategy, charging decisions (especially in regard to hate crimes); arrest strategy; line of inquiry; family liaison; media strategy; search strategy; and other sensitive matters.

Change in Action

Based on BPD's Internal Affairs Division and Northeastern University preliminary benchmarking of other department's processes, a decision was made to deviate from the Northern Ireland model and to move toward the purchase and implementation of IA Pro software. BPD command staff believes that IA Pro's tracking system will aid the early intervention with potential problem officers. Northeastern University agreed to work with the department to set the indicators on the software, that is, to tailor it so that police managers can easily track citizen complaints in particular categories against particular officers or within particular units/commands.

IA Pro will give the BPD access to a comprehensive secure electronic monitoring system with the capacity to not only document critical decisions, but also to further the ability to map decision points and produce immediate statistical analysis. In addition to increasing the effectiveness of the operations by automating these systems, IA Pro will provide transparency to police decisions therefore enhancing accountability to the community.

In April 2007, the BPD created an implementation and installation schedule for the IA Pro as well as BlueTeam software systems. BlueTeam, a new "sibling" software product introduced by IA Pro at their third annual User's Conference in November 2007, greatly enhances IA Pro's capabilities to support supervisory activities and will be installed following IA Pro. Training on the new system took place prior to and during the period of May 21–24, 2007; however, the installation of the software took place over the phone in advance of the arrival of training staff in Boston. BPD staff was trained on site by CI Technologies Inc., a leading provider of criminal investigation and intelligence software. CI Technologies Inc. provides hands-on training that utilizes a special edition of IA Pro to introduce the software to new users. Training was conducted in a computer classroom setting conducive to an effective training process with few interruptions and one person per computer station.

The installation and implementation of IA Pro and BlueTeam software also involved the conversion of internal affairs databases to the new system and the creation of a human resources integration project. Importing human resources data into the internal investigations database allows internal investigations to stay up to date on changes in employee information such as current assignments or the acquisition of new staff. This interdepartmental sharing of key employee records information ensures that decisions are made on the most current information at all times, and in turn has the potential to expedite internal affairs investigation processes.

Lasting Impact

As of this writing, the installation and implementation of the IA Pro system was in its early phases. While the staff has been trained, it will take some time to comprehend the lasting impact of the new system. Nevertheless, BPD's ongoing commitment to the implementation of an automated system for internal auditing is something that has already increased accountability to the community, and by extension has enhanced BPD's ongoing community policing initiatives. Further, it is anticipated that the appropriate implementation and use of the IA Pro software will improve BPD's internal auditing capabilities to track and analyze use of force, respond to citizen complaints, and handle other operational matters.

Lessons Learned

While the benefits of the system remain under, based on the department's previous experience implementing the Detective Case Management (DCM) system, BPD anticipates a number of challenges with the implantation of IA Pro. With automated systems like DCM and IA Pro, the department benefits from increases to both efficiency and accountability. However, both systems' initial resistance to the incorporation of what can be viewed as yet another reporting requirement into officers' daily routines can represent an obstacle to successful implementation. BPD learned from the DCM process that educating end-users early and often on the benefits of new automated systems as they directly relate to facilitating and not hindering individuals' daily routines can

greatly ease and expedite implementation. To this end, BPD ensured that adequate training on how to enter data into the IA Pro system was conducted to ensure full functionality of the system. The department also received another visit from CI Technologies Inc., which administered advanced IA Pro training and answered questions for the new BPD users.

Lastly, as learned during the implementation of DCM, the department found that forming a short- and long-term support and training network for end-users of any new automated system is critical for its success. It is not enough to install software, provide training, and expect the project to work. Ongoing maintenance is required in the form of available technical support personnel, training for new officers, and refresher courses. The BPD remains positive that the installation of the IA Pro software will enhance the accountability and efficiency of the internal investigations process, and looks forward to a full review of the benefits of the software in the future.

Strategy 2: Improving Citizen Complaint Processes

Focus of Strategy

Over the past several years, one of the areas the Boston Police Department has made the greatest strides is the investigation of citizen complaints about police. Boston's Bureau of Professional Standards and Development's (BPS&D) Internal Investigations Division has established model practices in areas such as early intervention with officers who are subject to repeat complaints from the public, as well as upgrading departmental qualifications and training necessary for assignment to the vision. Former Commissioner Evans initiated this commitment to occupational standards, and it endures today as only one example of the Boston Police Department's dedication to continual improvement of both the integrity within the department and reputation of the department in the community. Though these enhancements represented marked success, under the auspices of the Enhancing Cultures of Integrity grant, BPS&D managers also focused on the "front-end" of the investigative process. They wanted to gain insight into the accessibility of the complaint process to the typical citizen and to examine how the intake process functions to ensure that citizens perceive that they have an unfettered right to seek redress when they feel they have been ill-treated by a member of the department.

A typical citizen complaint in Boston is lodged when a person feels that a police officer was rude or neglectful toward his or her situation, or treated him or her in a rude or neglectful manner. Excessive use of force, in contrast, is a minor concern among citizens, as more than 80 percent of citizens in the department's 2001 Public Service Survey said that use of force is a minor or nonexistent problem in the city. Although citizens indicated they are not being physically mistreated, do not perceive that other citizens are being mistreated, and can currently be assured of a full and professional investigation upon lodging a complaint, the department still chose this strategy out of concern that more could be done to reduce existing obstacles to the intake process.

To address this concern, the department worked with Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice to complete a thorough review of the intake process. One issue explored was the degree to which designating police stations as the primary portal for intake of complaints discouraged citizens desiring to file a complaint from doing so. Although police stations are important locations for building community trust for many citizens, the department was interested if an alternative system could be implemented for those citizens who feel uncomfortable lodging a complaint at a police station against the very officers who serve there.

To gain more knowledge regarding the intake process, the department planned to conduct intake testing, using researchers as prospective complainants, to gain "realistic" insight into how random complaints are received at station houses. The following questions are a sample of those used to analyze the experience of the faux-complainants:

- Are complainants treated with proper courtesy and provided prompt service?
- Are supervisors ready and willing to sit with complainants and take their information?
- How long does the typical citizen wait for assistance when filing a complaint?
- What is the tone and content of the way in which he or she is treated?
- Do we need to expand the numbers and types of venues at which complaints will be accepted?

By asking and answering these questions, BPS&D hoped to develop new intake procedures that eliminate any and all barriers identified in the review.

BPS&D is also concerned with improving the manner in which citizens perceive the investigative process once they have successfully lodged a complaint. Improving the flow of communication between investigating officers and complainants could lead to greater legitimacy for the police. For example, citizens who are made to feel as though their comments and concerns are taken seriously will then have more confidence in the performance of the department in its other operating functions. BPD's Public Service Survey serves as a key tool to understanding the perceptions of the public on issues such as communication between the police and the community. The survey demonstrates that while the level of technical proficiency among BPS&D investigators and supervisors meets and exceeds all national standards, complainants still appear to believe that they are not kept sufficiently informed about the progress and outcomes of investigations. Statistics from the 1999 survey reveal that among those who reported having filed a complaint against a police officer within the previous year, 55 percent reported that they never heard back from police or that they did not know the outcome. With more than half of those citizens surveyed who had filed reports unsure of the outcome of their efforts, the department took action to implement change. The department proposed to have the DOJ and Northeastern University consultants assist in interviewing complainants post-process in order to look for opportunities to improve the overall process, especially in the area of communications flow.

Change in Action

On behalf of BPD, Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice (IRJ) completed an analysis of the intake portion of the citizen complaint process. IRJ reviewed a random sample of complaint cases, interviewed captains and superintendents, and conducted focus group meetings with community members. The BPD command staff continues to collaborate with the citizen groups and the three police unions to ensure implementation of a system that is fair and responsive to the community, as well as to the concerns of police officers.

IRJ also assisted BPD with research and analysis relating to the development of a Civilian Review Board. Beginning in 2004, IRJ Director Jack McDevitt and his team at Northeastern completed research that included the following:

- A literature review of relevant research on Citizen/Community Appeals Boards
- A study of the experiences of four cities: Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Denver, Colorado; and Phoenix, Arizona, which included both site visits and conference calls
- A series of local community focus groups
- A series of meetings with concerned local community groups
- Surveys of officers and citizens who have been involved in the dispensation of a complaint with the BPS&D
- Outreach to all three relevant police unions: the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association; the Boston Police Superior Officers Federation; and the Boston Police Detectives Benevolent Society.

Based on this research and BPD's history/current conditions, the IRJ team issued a final report of recommendations in December 2005 relating to the development of a Community Appeals Board for the Boston Police Department to then Commissioner Kathleen O'Toole, and Boston's Mayor Menino subsequently reviewed it.

Lasting Impact

On August 24, 2006, Mayor Menino announced that he would create a three-member Civilian Review and Mediation Board. On August 25, *The Boston Globe* reported that the new Board "will serve as representatives of the public, with powers to examine internal police investigations of officers accused of wrongdoing."[2] Based largely on IRJ's recommendations, Mayor Menino's current plan includes creating a board that will be made up of part-time, paid members who will be empowered to ask Internal Affairs investigators to enhance their work on individual complaints under review. Similarly, under the mayor's plan, the board will have the authority to make recommendations to the police commissioner about specific cases, but they will not have subpoena power or the power to conduct their own investigation. In January 2007, Mayor Menino announced the selection of three ombudspersons for the new Civilian Review Board.[3]

2 Slack, Donovan, "Mayor to Form Civilian Panel for Complaints about Police," *The Boston Globe,* August 26, 2006. www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/08/25/mayor_to_form_civilian_panel_for_complaints_about_police/?page=1.

3 Slack, Donovan, "Menino Taps 3 for Police Review Board," *The Boston Globe*, January 23, 2007.

Lessons Learned

Ensuring that citizen complaints are handled appropriately, professionally, and in an expeditious manner is a cornerstone to any police department's integrity efforts. Further, ensuring that the local community understands the equality and fairness of the complaint resolution process is the critical component of the trust required for successful community policing. The resolution of citizen complaints touches at the very core of community trust in the police; therefore, community organizations and individuals are acutely attentive to all efforts to review, enhance, or amend the citizen complaint review process. Similarly, because the dispensation of citizen complaints has a direct effect on individuals within the department and consequently workforce moral and management, efforts to adjust or amend the processes in place are of particular concern to police unions, department management, and local politicians. With all of these distinct and often passionate interests focused on this strategy, work in this area can be challenging.

Inclusion of the above mentioned interest groups in the development or adaptation of processes is critical. Where this is not feasible, proactive outreach and education about the nature of the changes or research processes under way are exceptionally beneficial, as they can help to ensure that no one group feels blindsided or that their interests were intentionally disregarded. BPD has found that openness and transparency are both critical components to any review of a department's civilian complaint process.

Strategy 3: Ensuring Accountability to the Community on Special Events Planning and Intelligence Collection

Focus of Strategy

The 2004 Democratic National Convention (DNC) generated unprecedented demands on the Boston Police Department. The department needed to balance the often competing interests of protecting the security of official participants and the civil liberties of dissenters while identifying and targeting those with criminal intent on a large and small scale. While this balancing test is an everyday reality in almost all policing processes, the magnitude and scope of these issues were exponentially broadened in that this was the first national nominating convention since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The department felt it was particularly important to maintain accountability to the community and its collective needs and concerns relating to police practices throughout planning police strategy for the event. This effort was important not only as part of a successful strategy at the DNC, but also as part of the department's ongoing focus on, and investment in, building the community's trust as a foundation to all community policing initiatives.

Despite the extraordinary nature of the event, the department embraced this complex strategic imperative. Specifically, the department approached their responsibilities relating to the convention and the associated intelligence-gathering initiatives with the following core principals in mind:

- Protecting mutual trust and respect with the community
- Maintaining the public's belief in the good faith use of intelligence by police, and a continued willingness to see BPD as a place that citizens can report suspicions without fear of misuses of such reports by officials
- Upholding the Constitutional rights of all parties
- Working in partnership with all parties to complete the mission.

As part of this effort, the department proposed a national benchmarking study, focusing on those jurisdictions and departments that had faced similar challenges. The benchmarking set was originally proposed to include Philadelphia (2000 Republican Convention); Los Angeles (2000 Democratic Convention); New York City (2004 Republican Convention and post-September 11 threats generally); Seattle (1999 World Trade Organization Conference); Salt Lake City (2002 Winter Olympic Games); and Washington, D.C. (International Monetary Fund and numerous other events). Further, the strategy also called for a review of this benchmarking initiative by key stakeholder groups in the civil rights community with the hopes of creating a dialog about the goals, methods, and limits of the intelligence function.

Change in Action

When Boston Police Superintendent Robert Dunford first learned of his appointment to be responsible for the security at the Democratic National Convention in July 2004, he knew one of his main challenges would be crowd control. A long-time district commander in Dorchester, Supt. Dunford also knew the importance of early engagement of community members in planning any enforcement approaches. In response to this challenge, he began to develop new strategic management tactics that would serve the city administrators, citizens, visitors, and police officers equally well.

Supt. Dunford and a team of civilian research analysts initiated their planning for the Convention by compiling relevant literature concerning best practices in the area of crowd control. The review revealed that existing thought on policing best practices was out of synch with the current trends in analyzing crowd behavior. At the time, there were few operational examples available in police journals and best practices literature regarding how to integrate current scholarship on how crowds behave into practice. It was within this context that the BPD set out to link more recent analysis of crowd behavior with the development of their strategy.

The BPD team studied crowd control work done in Northern Ireland during Orange Parades, an annual celebration to commemorate the victory of the forces of the Protestant English king, William of Orange, over the Catholic king he deposed, James II in 1690, whereby confirming Protestant rule in Ireland.[4] To this day, crowd control during parade season is notoriously high-stakes, subject to high levels of public scrutiny, and where decision-making reports are routinely offered as public documents following events. These factors, combined with the volatility of the parades and the likelihood of crowd-police confrontations, offered significant learning opportunities for police in Boston leading up to the convention. Specifically, the Boston team decided to:

4 "The Marching Season: A Question of Rights and Wrongs," 2000. In CNN In-Depth Special, "Conflict and Hope in Northern Ireland," July 5, 2007. www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/n.ireland/marching.html

- Reach out and work with the organizations that had announced their intention to demonstrate in order to be prepared for those demonstrations, an initiative that exhibited the police department's commitment to protecting the civil right to demonstrate
- Plan with police officers for deviations by the groups from the established, agreed upon plan for demonstration areas and sites, and allow police discretion in determining when these changes were material to public safety and when they could be tolerated without jeopardizing safety
- Use logs to record decisions in the field that required the use of police discretion or which reflected a change from established policy, protocol, or procedure
- Create after action reports to serve as a public record of the event in case questions arose after the convention that required investigation or where the public wanted more information about specific elements of the law enforcement strategy.

Supt. Dunford's Boston team, comprised of officers, civilian research staff, and consultants, developed a 3-phase strategy for planning, event management, and after action learning and debriefing. The strategy was founded on the department's commitments to community policing and partnership, as well as the knowledge that police activity must reflect a high degree of respect for community protesters and public participation in the event.

The following provides a detailed overview of the 3-step strategy that the Boston Police Department developed and implemented for the DNC:

Component 1: *Planning and Negotiation with Officers and Anarchists*

> "Police tend to think in black and white. When we analyzed our response to these plans, all we could see was grey. We were constantly making trade-offs and balancing community attitudes against safety, community engagement against security."
>
> —*Superintendent Robert Dunford*

This component began with a pre-event training session involving all of the commanders who would be responsible for organizing and positioning troops the day of the event. Discarding the idea that crowds behave hypnotically, follow a single leader, or develop a mob mentality, the

training was premised on the idea that people come to events with specific goals in mind for their participation and make conscious decisions during the event in support of their ability to reach those goals. The training was designed around a series of scenarios that could transpire during the convention and could pose a significant challenge to public safety.

The session brought together 45 officers likely to be zone commanders the day of the event for full-day training on 15 scenarios deemed most likely to disrupt the convention. The scenarios were constructed to simulate difficult and confusing situations that could arise during the event. For example, one scenario dealt with the possibility that the protester area would need to be fully cleared and how the police could accomplish that if they'd lost control of the crowd. The goal of the scenario training was to ensure that the command staff had an opportunity identify and plan response strategies for a wide variety of potential scenarios. The training resulted in written plans for each commander to keep throughout the event to guide his/her decision-making.

The officers were given scenarios similar to the following:

> *The city has issued a parade permit for a march from Fanueil Hall to the public demonstration area on Haverhill Street. The march will assemble at Fanueil Hall at 1700 hours. At 1800 hours the march will proceed onto Congress Street, staying on the outbound side, cross new Sudbury Street and continue on Congress to New Chardon. The march will turn right on New Chardon, and end on Canal Street, where the marchers will join the public protesters. The march is orderly but there are Anarchists marching as a group within the larger group. The Anarchists have been denied a separate permit for a demonstration inside Fanueil Hall at the Governor's Association Meeting.*

As a large group, and in smaller sub groups, the zone commanders brainstormed potential problems, analyzed the logistics of the event, and collaboratively developed potential responses. When a consensus on the best strategy was reached, the response was recorded, documented, and set aside for future use. Some scenarios addressed political demonstrations, others problems like heat stroke, lighting storms, and train breakdowns.

The scenario plans were integrated in the operational plan for the event and the tactics outlined in them were offered to every officer and commander working the event to ensure a common, calm, and collaborative response to the "unexpected." Other topics covered in the training included threats specific to the event itself (political insurgents, use of alcohol, threat of terrorism) and specific infrastructure needing special protection, including famous buildings, rapid transit, etc.

By the conclusion of the training, the participants had worked through 12 of 15 scenarios and determined that the remaining three were similar enough to the 12 established plans that they were sufficiently covered. As a result of the training, 45 commanders shared a set of guidelines for tactical operations for events that had not, and might not, occur. No scenario was declared "done" until consensus had been reached among the commanders as to how it should be handled.

When the scenario planning was completed, some of the newly trained police commanders met with leaders of established community groups. While stopping short of offering detailed deployment plans, they worked closely with the groups to establish some common understandings about where demonstrations were to take place, what demonstration conditions were acceptable, and which would require a law enforcement intervention. Despite this attempt at open communication, community group leaders were unhappy about the parameters established for their demonstrations, and in fact, brought a court challenge to the established demonstration zone. They were unsuccessful in that challenge and the zone was maintained.

Despite the debate over whether or not the demonstration zone was a tolerable measure to prevent public safety problems, the underlying concept was that the police were aiming to balance two important objectives: preservation and protection of protesters' First Amendment rights and the protection of the public against the real threat of terrorist attacks. Their approach to achieving both objectives simultaneously was built upon the community engagement strategy that has been working for Boston's routine street crime suppression initiatives for the past decade.

Component 2: *Decision Logs*

While everyone recognized that situations would necessarily arise that were unpredicted and surprising, officers also felt that such situations would conform generally enough to one of the established 12 scenario plans that they could adapt the plan and make good decisions in the moment on issues like deployment and changes in policy. A few of the decisions that the group made in the scenario planning included these event-day strategies:

Deployment

- The entire demonstration area was apportioned into zones; each zone had an appointed zone commander.
- Zone commanders could leverage help and support from Quick Response Teams.
- Each zone also had a traffic team to deploy according to activity within the zone.

Mobility and Image

- More officers on foot, bicycle and horses
- Fewer officers on motorcycles and in cars
- More officers were in "soft cover" rather than uniform.

Communications

- Video cameras feeding images to intelligence officers at command center
- Command center using operations guides from scenarios to help deploy flexible responders
- Development and utilization of "decision logs."

Many of the deployment decisions had to be revisited during the events. For Supt. Dunford, the decision logs were one of the key original decisions:

> *We had an area for demonstrators that we'd said couldn't have signage put up on it as we were concerned about decreased visibility for the security personnel watching out for the dignitaries coming through that area. But some protesters did put signs there. When I saw the actual signs and the impact on visibility, I decided that the risks of agitating the protesters by removing the signs were greater than the minimal obscuring of the sight lines. So I decided the signs could stay. This was a deviation from the plan, and I took a minute to record the decision, and the rationale behind it, in the log for use later should that decision need to be revisited.*

The decision logs are tools used to promote better analysis of controversial police actions by both police investigators and community groups after the fact. Supt. Dunford now promotes their use in many other types of enforcement situations and they are gaining support among the rank and file as they provide a vehicle for explaining, to community groups who have concerns, the complex decision-making situations in which officers often find themselves. For community groups, the logs offer data on what factors were given priority in cases where police are exercising judgment. This function of the decision logs promotes police-community communication, and in removing the community speculation with straightforward details of decision-making processes, police-community relations are bolstered by accountability and transparency; important factors in the success of the community policing model.

Component 3: *After Action Reports*

Following the events, the team under Dunford's supervision also created "After Action Reports." These documents reported on tactical elements that did and did not work, and reflected surprise at how well the scenario planning prepared commanders to proceed carefully and with a higher level of responsiveness to community concerns. The reports described a range of elements in play at the event, including assessments of decisions made in contradiction to established plans and a chronological review of observations and recommendations for future situation planning.

Lasting Impact: The Boston Regional Intelligence Center

The community engagement strategy the department employed during the convention, particularly as it related to intelligence-gathering capacities, served as the basis for the creation of the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC). Housed in the Boston Police Department, the BRIC was created as a mechanism to bring together intelligence personnel and resources of the Boston Police Department, municipal police departments, Massachusetts State Police, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations, United States Coast Guard, Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority, and others, for intelligence distribution and response to key critical events. The goal of this initiative was to integrate technology in the creation of intelligence products and the prevention of critical incidents in and around Boston. Upon its creation, the BRIC was tasked to develop and implement a Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis strategic plan for the Metro-Boston region, outlining key planning and coordination mandates among the appropriate United States Intelligence Community agencies. Planning and collaboration included the design of emergency operation plans, intelligence analysis, data sharing, and sharing of analytical techniques. The BRIC was also uniquely positioned in the law enforcement and intelligence communities to provide the necessary consulting framework for the successful integration of information analysis into daily operations and critical incidents.

To enhance the intelligence capacity of BRIC, the BPD tapped both new and existing resources. The department dedicated sworn intelligence officers and civilian intelligence analysts to staff this initiative, acquired state-of-the-art technology to provide an array of real-time intelligence products, and trained nontraditional first responders in detection and identification of potential indicators of terrorism. Merging Geographical Information Technology and Critical Incident Management software capabilities, the BRIC is equipped to access regional crime information and databases, restricted federal data services, and free and paid public source information. Information—or raw data—is provided to BRIC through the unique collaboration of various public and private entities and partners. Further, the implementation of the BRIC includes a strong commitment to police and community collaboration and has allowed officers to obtain a higher level of performance in gathering intelligence, while protecting mutual trust and respect with the community; encouraging the public's belief in the good faith use of intelligence by police; and working in partnership with law enforcement and community groups.

Lessons from the Democratic National Convention

In July 2004, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge said, "Credible reporting indicates that al-Qaeda is moving forward with plans to carry out a large scale attack in the United States aimed to disrupt our democratic process…one of the hallmarks of that process is taking place in less than 2 weeks here in Boston." City, state, and federal law enforcement worked together in Boston for a full year to ensure that the city would remain safe from terrorist attacks during the Democratic National Convention and for the events surrounding it. With planning described as "monumental," these law enforcement agencies worked hard to utilize Boston's proven community

policing strategies to ensure that a majority of citizens understood the security plans and were a part of the plans to keep the city safe.

As a result of that community engagement process during the DNC, the department has made some additional changes to its routine event management and intelligence collection operations. Specifically, whereas the department used to employ a "special events" office for the planning and execution of this type of event preparation, the functions that office served are now integrated into the Bureau of Field Services, giving these operations both better background knowledge and greater credibility. The same officers who work with community groups all year long are now charged with working with them to plan security for major events. Additionally, the After Action Reports and the pre-event trainings are both helpful ongoing tools for district commanders to use in their efforts to manage the resources (particularly officer time/manpower) required for these types of events. Lastly, scenario planning enabled the department to safeguard the protesters, marchers, and other groups of participants by anticipating events that could interfere or jeopardize that safety. As a result, the use of the planning provided a platform for building, rather than testing, police-community relationships that are so essential to community policing in Boston.

In terms of relationships with the community, much of the value in community policing results from the bi-directional flow of information between police and constituents, which naturally enhances intelligence efforts. The challenge leading up to the convention was, and continues to be, formalizing the relationships and incorporating them into the intelligence process in a way that is beneficial to both police and community. The BPD continues to use lessons learned from that experience as it confronts an increase in violent and youth crime, including a renewed commitment to intelligence driven community policing. Specifically, as part of the ongoing effort to prevent wrongful convictions, respond to the community, and provide a measure of transparency to police operations, the BPD has overhauled its interrogation techniques and witness identification procedures.

Strategy 4: Adaptation of Command Staff Integrity Training

Focus of Strategy

The Regional Community Policing Institute of New England (RCPI/NE) has developed four new training programs looking at key police leadership issues through the lens of ethics and integrity: *Citizen Complaint Intake and Investigation Issues; Early Identification and Intervention Systems; Racial Profiling: Issues and Dilemmas*; and *Use of Force Issues in a Community Policing Environment*. These curricula were designed to assist police executives with outreach in their respective communities. Each curriculum engages police executives in an interactive learning experience that includes facilitated discussions, small-group work, and case analysis. Further, the programs draw on participants' experience as they develop the knowledge and skills they need to review, assess and, if necessary, change their departments' approach to these issues. Each curriculum includes a comprehensive instructor's guide and a detailed participant's guide.

Specifically, RCPI/NE curriculum includes:

Citizen Complaint Intake and Investigation Issues: This curriculum is geared to chiefs and senior managers who oversee, review, and revise their agencies' citizen complaint intake and investigation practices. The daylong training program will help participants learn to identify the value of a proactive citizen complaint intake policy. They will discuss in detail a sample process for assessing their departments' citizen complaint intake procedures. This sample process then will serve as a tool for reviewing and strengthening the way each department approaches the issue. By the end of the day, these departmental leaders will see how the citizen complaint and intake process is a leading indicator of a department's commitment to ethics and integrity.

Early Identification and Intervention Systems: Chiefs and senior managers will gain the skills to design a new system or review and revise an existing system for early identification of and intervention with officers whose conduct is potentially problematic. After gaining an understanding of the definitions, focuses, goals, and components of such systems, participants will review a process for identifying, intervening with, and following up with officers. They will work on approaches to reviewing supervisory and organizational issues or problems within the system. The end product of this 2-day curriculum will be an initial draft of an Early Identification and Intervention System specific to the participant's agency and a knowledge base to begin developing implementation strategies.

Racial Profiling – Issues and Dilemmas: This teaches chiefs and senior managers to identify key areas of concern regarding racial profiling in their agencies and communities. Participants explore the delicate balance between preventing and addressing criminal activity while protecting civil liberties in a democratic society. The curriculum focuses on leadership and communication related to the following issues:

- Definition(s) of racial profiling
- Data collection and analysis
- Internal agency issues
- Community relationships.

Using the information gleaned from discussions of these issues, participants work through a racial profile case example scenario with three possible outcomes. Before the 1-day session ends, they are asked to formulate an action plan for dealing with racial-profiling issues in their departments.

Use of Force Issues in a Community Policing Environment: The actions of police executives and command staff set the tone for the way use of force issues are dealt with in an organization and the way the community views its police department. This 1-day training session will help chiefs and senior managers identify areas of concern regarding use of force issues, both within the department and in the community. Participants will bring focus to their discussion using a multifaceted model addressing beliefs, alignment and balance, training, accountability and communication, and leadership and integrity. The model forms the basis for participant analysis

of case examples. At the end of the training, participants will be ready to apply the Use of Force Issues model to identify steps that may need to be taken in their own departments.

Under this strategy, BPD planned to enhance engagement with these programs and ensure that the entire command staff completed the training in these areas. Additionally, under this strategy BPD planned to work with RCPI/NE to modify these four curricula to reach a new audience—Boston Police lieutenants and sergeants. These key, first-line supervisors are closest to the difficult decisions being made by police on the street, and inevitably make the first determinations in cases and regarding appropriateness of decisions of patrol officers and detectives. Once modified for the audience, trainings were planned for all BPD lieutenants and detectives.

Change in Action

The BPD has collaborated with the Regional Community Policing Institute of New England to enhance and implement a series of training programs and workshops including the four new programs detailed above. During the project, the BPD expanded its efforts to include the development of procedures and additional trainings on the use of force, including the use of nonlethal weapons such as pepper pellet guns. Superintendents and captains participated in 1-day sessions on the complexities and responsibilities associated with using force in the line of duty. The training model used case studies that allowed participants to: engage their beliefs and experiences regarding the use of force; examine and discuss police accountability in the field; study the impact of using force on community and police relations; and consider the relationship between the issues surrounding the use of force and police integrity and leadership. BPD has also worked with the Regional Community Policing Institute of New England to modify the trainings and curricula for lieutenants and sergeants who are closest to the patrol officers and detectives and serve as their direct supervisors.

Lasting Impact

BPD's ongoing investment in integrity-related training, both for the command staff as well as supervisors and line officers, is an important component to its ongoing community policing efforts. Not only have the trainings provided a lasting positive impact on participants but it also had helped the community understand BPD's ongoing commitment to self-reflection and improvement.

Lessons Learned

While working to adapt and enhance training for both command staff and line supervisors alike, BPD continues to focus on the key elements that make any departmental training a success: its ability to engage participants; its relevance to real world problem solving; and its integration into other ongoing training initiatives as well as roll call. While implementing this strategy, the importance of these elements were once again encountered, as well as the importance of incorporating scenario planning into training modules and remembering to include line level officers in the training design process.

Strategy 5: Review and Enhancement of Use of Force Policy and Training

Focus of Strategy

Per the above, under this strategy BPD set out to enhance and adapt RCPI/NE's *Use of Force Issues in a Community Policing Environment* to meet BPD's current needs as they relate to providing training to both command staff and line supervisors.

Change in Action

BPD has completed the RCPI use of force training with all the BPD officers and is now revising internal rules and regulations to reflect the department's current values and mission of proactive, community oriented policing.

Lasting Impact

As mentioned previously, BPD's ongoing investment in integrity-related training, particularly as it relates to use of force issues both for the command staff, supervisors, and line officers is an important component in its ongoing community policing efforts. The trainings have provided a lasting positive impact on participants as well as the community.

Lessons Learned

When working to adapt and enhance training for both command staff and line supervisors alike, BPD continues to focus on the key elements that make any departmental training a success: its ability to engage participants; its relevance to real world problem solving; and its integration into other ongoing training initiatives as well as roll call. While implementing this strategy the importance of these elements were once again encountered as well as the importance of incorporating scenario planning and to remembering to include line level officers in the training design process. Additionally, continual efforts to include relevant policies and procedures from other city departments help to enhance training initiatives.

Strategy 6: Recruitment Initiative

Focus of Strategy

Declined applicant numbers, decreased diversity of applicant pools, and lack of community participation in the recruitment process all led to the adoption of the Recruitment Initiative as a strategy for enhanced integrity at the BPD. A drastic decline in applicant numbers from 5,430 in 1997 to just 1,345 in 2005, and a smaller, though significant decline in minority candidates in the same 8-year period, forced the BPD to take action. The Recruitment Initiative launched in 2006 used the strategies of planning for, investing in, and implementing innovative recruitment techniques founded on the mobilization of police-community partnerships to ensure both increased applicant numbers and diversity of applicants in both the short and long term. Through this initiative, BPD

collaborated with the community to get the message out that it wanted, and would be proud to have, persons from all backgrounds, and of diverse demographics serve and protect the city. A police force consisting of officers that look like, talk like, and understand the issues of the diverse communities they hail from could make great strides in community policing efforts for the city.

Change in Action

In order to accomplish the goals of increasing the candidate pool, increasing diversity, and the creation of a recruitment initiative that would reflect community policing philosophies, BPD designed a phased approach resulting in a drastic change in recruitment policies.

Phase I: *Recruitment Strategy*

The commander of Recruit Investigations, Sergeant Detective Norman Hill, formed a Recruitment Committee to develop strategies that would address the ways in which the goals for recruitment could be realized. The committee concluded that a revolutionary marketing campaign, together with police-community partnerships could effectively remedy the lack of diversity and lack of applicants.

Phases II and III: *Marketing Campaign and Police-Community Partnerships*

Police-community partnership was integral to the success of developing a marketing strategy that would work to reach diverse ethic, racial, and age groups throughout the city. Though both law enforcement officials and community members were eager to solve the short-term immediate need for more applicants, long-term changes to recruitment strategies were also discussed through a series of "working sessions" held with law enforcement officials and community stakeholders beginning in February 2007 to enact effective policies to ensure lasting change. During the first of these sessions, participants discussed ideas and recommendations to improve BPD recruiting efforts in the areas of:

- Informational/educational outreach in schools, starting with the elementary level and following through all the way to local colleges, universities, and community colleges
- Potential locations for recruitment including schools, churches, YM/WCA's fitness facilities, other places where young people congregate
- Changing/updating the image of the position of a police officer as a modern, diverse, opportunity-filled, and rewarding occupation
- Addressing cultural barriers, language barriers, and recruit minorities who may not feel as though they would be welcome to apply
- Reaching a younger audience through investing in modern media marketing avenues and catchy pictures/slogans
- Investing in scholarship opportunities or waiving the $75 exam fee

- Having a team approach, dispatch recruitment officers and respected community members as a team in order to build community trust and acceptance for the recruiter
- Engaging key community groups, members, and city officials in recruitment efforts.

The ideas and recommendations made in the first working session heavily influenced decisions made regarding the recruitment marketing campaign undertaken by BPD. With April 2, the final sign-up date for the police civil service exam to be administered on May 19 swiftly approaching, a major multifaceted marketing campaign was launched by the BPD. This campaign included not only traditional recruitment methods used in the past such as distributing brochures, newspaper ads, posters, and conducting media interviews, but also showcased new nontraditional recruitment techniques designed by the BPD at the suggestion of community members. These nontraditional methods included posters, flyers, and leaflets depicting young, ethnically and racially diverse police officers accomplishing a wide range of police operations ranging from patrolling Boston Common on a motorcycle to photographing crime scenes or doing community outreach in the form of teaching martial arts. The images, all presented with the slogan, "Many Jobs, One Career, Boston's Future," also included both the final sign-up date for taking the police civil service exam, and the date the exam was to be administered.

Phase IV: Strategic Planning Process

The working sessions held with law enforcement officials and community members did more than just generate a list of ways in which the police could, should they decide to, augment their recruitment process. These sessions generated important results that played a large role in the success of increased applicant numbers and diversity for 2007. Following the first of two working sessions, law enforcement officials went to work designing and generating the posters, slogan, and marketing campaign first discussed. These "first-drafts" were then reviewed by the community members and improved upon. Community members suggested that an administrator be added to the recruitment initiative team to oversee the operation and organize the mobilization of three major teams (comprised of city officials, police officers, and community members/leaders) responsible for recruitment in various areas of the city. Also, important modifications were made to the advertising materials in order to reach more diverse constituencies. Eleven different posters were printed in multiple languages such as Spanish, Vietnamese, and French Creole, in order to reflect the concept that the BPD thrives on, and welcomes diversity. All of these community-generated suggestions were implemented by the BPD before the official launch of the recruitment initiative.

In a second working session, the three major recruitment teams mentioned above convened with others involved in the initiative and developed the multimedia marketing scheme that was to be the cornerstone of the recruitment efforts. Marketing tools utilized by the Recruitment Initiative included sending out email blasts containing information in the same format as the posters, leaflets, and flyers to listservs generated and shared by various community groups. Billboards also splashed the need for excellent recruits along the many major highways feeding into the city.

A career options web site was added to the information already available on the BPD's web site describing the process of applying to be, and being accepted as, a recruit for the BPD. The web site could (and can) also be accessed from a link on the city of Boston's web site. Law enforcement officials and community members also staged "stand-outs" where recruitment would occur from various on-site locations in the city using a police van as "home" in order to turn recruitment into a publicly visible activity. Radio commercials, free giveaways, and a water and sewer mailing that was sent to 90,000 Boston residences were all accomplished in an onslaught of multimedia marketing all designed through police-community partnerships.

Phase V: *Preliminary Assessment*

Early evaluation of the Recruitment Initiative by those who participated in the collaborative effort has highlighted the resulting short term advantages as: a better working relationship with the Massachusetts Human Resources Department, the office charged with overseeing entry into the police academy, the development of short-and long-term strategies for recruitment, shifting public opinion of the BPD, and strengthened partnerships with the community and city departments.

Lasting Impact

The effort demonstrated by the Recruitment Initiative's police-community partnership resulted in 2,548 applicants completing the police civil service exam on May 19, 2007; the highest number of applicants since 2001. Minority groups were represented in the following percentages of the total applicant class: 28.8 percent Black (735), 15 percent Hispanic (386), 3 percent Asian (86), and 0.5 percent Native American (14). Although the raw numbers are impressive when considered alone, they become even more striking when considered in the context of the percentage increase in applicants from the most recent applicant pool from 2005. When comparing the 2005 and 2007 applicant pools, minority applications increased in the following ways: Black, 87 percent (392–735); Hispanic, 98 percent (195–386); Asian, 82 percent (45–82); Native American, 133 percent (6–14). Similarly, nonminority applications increased 88 percent from 2005 as 1,331 applications were received in 2007 compared to 707 in 2005.

The number and diversity of female applicants that were attracted to careers at the BPD demonstrate another success of the Recruitment Initiative. In total, 327 females completed the civil service exam, the most since 2001. Following in the history of female applicants, the 2007 female pool reflects the most diversity in any one demographic category. More Black than nonminority female applicants took the civil service exam in 2007, with 150 and 105 respectively. In total, females who identify as Black, Hispanic (63), Asian (6), or Native American (3) outnumber the nonminority applicants 222 to 105, or 53 percent to 47 percent. Although the total number of female applicants remains low in comparison to the years of 1997–2001, the diverse applicant pool for females comes closest to reflecting the diversity of Boston, one of the expressed goals of the Recruitment Initiative.

The percentage of applicants citywide versus statewide also rebounded in 2007 from the lows recorded in 2003 and 2005. The 2007 city of Boston applicant pool (5,458) represented 19.4 percent of the total statewide applicants (13,110), a percentage that comes closer to the percentages reported from 1997–2001 when the overall applicant pool was much larger. When city versus statewide data are examined for females alone, it can be observed that the female minority applicants from the city of Boston represent much of the diversity in the applicant pool for the entire state. Black females from the Boston applicant pool represent 64 percent of Black females statewide, Hispanic females 35 percent of Hispanic females statewide, Asian females 26 percent, and Native American females 30 percent. Similarly, when city versus statewide data are considered for males alone, it becomes evident that the city of Boston applicants were very diverse. Black males from the city of Boston applicant pool represent 48 percent of Black males statewide, Hispanic males 29 percent of Hispanic males statewide, Asian male 24 percent, and Native American males 21 percent.

The Recruitment Initiative received praise from various sources for its success. The initiative was featured in the Boston Globe, Boston's premier newspaper. Featured within the article was praise for the initiative and the department from various community sources including positive responses from key religious and ethnic community leaders.[5] The Performance Institute, a private, nonpartisan think tank that is the nation's leading authority on performance-based management practices in a multitude of law enforcement and government areas also honored the Recruitment Initiative with the title of a best practice.[6] The department was also invited to make a presentation highlighting the initiative at the New England Major City Chiefs' Conference held at Roger Williams University's Justice System Training and Research Institute of New England. It was here that the police-community partnership forged by the initiative was recognized not only by the Institute, an emerging regional think tank and training venue for law enforcement in New England, but also by other regional law enforcement agencies in attendance.

5 Smalley, Suzanne. "Police recruiting draws surge in applicants." *The Boston Globe*. May 14, 2007.

6 "About Us." *The Performance Institute: Transferring Knowledge to Transform Government*, July 5, 2007. www.performanceweb.org/About/

Lessons Learned

Four major lessons were derived from the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the Recruitment Initiative. First, that examining trends in past applicant data could have led the BPD to change its recruitment strategies before the applicant pool had decreased to such low levels, and with such a lack of diversity. Second, that recruitment strategy can have short-term actions and consequences, but also needs to consider long-term effects and plans. Third, that project management, i.e., having an organizational scheme that involves managing a sustainable budget alongside innovative recruitment partnerships is key to long-term success. Fourth, and most important, that recruitment to policing as a profession from a city as diverse as Boston can only be successful if police and community members form lasting, meaningful, and motivated partnerships geared toward evolving the image of the police to attract a new generation of applicants that espouse and embody community policing philosophies. A larger and more diverse pool of applicants recruited by those community members who are the most active in their respective neighborhoods

partnered with police will not only reflect the city's diversity, but will also be uniquely positioned to perform the types of community outreach so critical to community policing efforts. The true test for the Recruitment Initiative will be staying current and modern, meaning that all future recruitment initiatives will have to evolve with changes in the image of police and changes in the demands of the communities they serve.

See Figure A3 in the Appendix for a chart illustrating the complex hiring process a recruit goes through. As a result of this initiative, this is the first time this process was captured and presented visually, to demystify a confusing process.

Strategy 7: Transition Team Focus Groups

Focus of Strategy

Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino, now serving his fourth consecutive term, announced in October 2006 that Edward F. Davis, then superintendent of the Lowell (Massachusetts) Police Department, would serve as Boston's 40th police commissioner. Following Commissioner Davis' swearing in ceremony in December 2006, the Office of the Police Commissioner contracted with Dr. Brenda Bond to create a Transition Team designed to investigate and identify issues and areas within the police department that could be improved. This strategy focused on fostering an atmosphere of open communication between existing personnel, both sworn and civilian, and the incoming administration, as well as ensuring any problems that hadn't been addressed or needed further attention from the old administration would not be carried over into the new administration without due attention. Through implementing this strategy, the Office of the Police Commissioner hoped to increase the flow of communication across the civilian/support staff versus sworn officer divide, interdepartmentally, and across districts citywide in an attempt to foster departmental accountability to internal problems.

Change in Action

The Office of the Police Commissioner advertised the creation of a department-wide Transition Team with the goal of soliciting employees from all levels to participate in guided focus groups designed to ascertain what issues within the department should be addressed. The commissioner did not want to perpetuate the status quo within the BPD, but instead offer a chance for employees to voice their concerns. The resulting Transition Team included 119 participants representing the ranks of civilian, patrol officer, detective, sergeant, sergeant detective, lieutenant, and lieutenant detective. Eleven Transition Team Focus Groups were then created out of the original transition team, and were comprised of 75 members, or 63 percent of those who had originally volunteered. Focus group meetings were facilitated by a researcher and spanned a total of 24 hours between February 28, 2007 and March 23, 2007.

At the initiation of each focus group meeting, the members of the group were asked to review a list of "Areas of Improvement" for the department. The list was derived from department records of long-term planning strategies, including all conversations, planning sessions, and retreats that had been discussed or identified since 1999. Following the review of the areas for improvement list, focus group members were asked a series of questions designed to solicit their priorities for change. Group responses to the following questions were reviewed and analyzed:

1. What is missing from the list that still needs attention?
2. What are the most pressing issues that still need priority attention?

After responses to these questions were recorded, groups were then asked to identify their top priorities from the list and answer the following questions:

1. What are the internal barriers to improvement in these priority areas?
2. What are the external barriers to improvement in these priority areas?

Researchers found that focus group members became so engaged in responding to the above-mentioned questions, that a third portion regarding what supervisors or managers could do to help employees/subordinates accomplish their jobs better had to be eliminated because of time constraints. Despite this cut in the process, researchers elicited a wealth of information regarding which areas of improvement should be prioritized by Commissioner Davis' incoming administration.

Researchers found focus group participants to be both honest about which areas need improvements and the challenges to make them. According to the report, participants were also "anxious and prepared" to voice their contributions. Although participants offered a range of issues, the most notable and salient across all 11 focus groups were issues of communication, resources, accountability, and training. Additionally, the problems highlighted within these areas were system-based, meaning that either the system or policy in place to deal with a certain issue was broken; there was no existing system to deal with such an issue; or the existing system needed correction.

In terms of communication, areas that could be improved were highlighted as mostly internal. Issues raised by the focus groups regarding communication included; lack of access to resources because of noncommunication of availability; no encouragement of (or a lack of consequences for not encouraging) a positive system of open communication; a culture of protecting instead of sharing information; poor distribution of intelligence information from the BRIC (Boston Regional Intelligence Center), and a lack of training on how to effectively use communication to motivate and inspire good work ethic. Externally, the focus groups felt that decisions affecting the patrol level were being made at the city hall and by the commissioner without input from those parties that would be affected the most.

Resource allocation was most often associated with a lack of standardized procedure regulating how, when, and to whom resources are to be distributed. Focus groups expressed the need to allocate resources, both human and technological, according to need and not desire, and

in a manner that maximizes skills and utility. Also suggested was implementing a baseline of technological capability for all districts. Focus groups also emphasized a large divide between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in terms of technology updates and tech support staff. Headquarters was perceived as having updated technology and a full support staff, while many districts that need the technology to implement policing strategies do not.

A system of accountability for the allocation of resources was suggested as a potential strategy for improvement.

Accountability, as it relates to consequences and rewards for tasks accomplished or not accomplished, as the case may be, was a common theme expressed throughout the facilitation of the focus groups. Under the "accountability systems" section of the original areas for improvement, coaching for professional improvement, effective supervision and management, performance review, span of control, and Compstat were all areas that researchers posited could be improved, and probed focus group members on their thoughts regarding these areas. Both effective supervision and management and performance review were sited repeatedly as members highlighted a sense of a "culture of mediocrity" within the department because of the absence of effective performance management tools. Not only was bad or lackadaisical work unacknowledged or reprimanded, but good work was not championed or rewarded. Managers were viewed as nonresponsive to subordinates at best, and unapproachable with problems at the worst. An overall sentiment for a need for better managerial training was a recurrent theme.

Not only did focus group members come to consensus regarding managerial training, but also concerning an increase in training and education opportunities for employees and sworn officers at all levels. Frustration with the lack of communication regarding training opportunities when they do exist, scarcity of reimbursement opportunities for training undertaken, and a need to develop training opportunities locally were issues that resounded with most groups.

Lasting Impact

Through initiating the creation of Transition Team Focus Groups, the Office of the Police Commissioner made an important first step in developing a more transparent and open police department. Through allowing employees a chance to voice their concerns with the ways in which the organization operates, an environment of open communication emerges and reliance upon the status quo falls by the wayside to be replaced by policies and procedures that cater to efficiency, rather than frustration. The positive impact of the Transition Team Focus Groups is two-fold. First, armed with the knowledge of what changes are prioritized by staff, the Office of the Police Commissioner can enact internal policies that will be welcome changes instead of added bureaucracy. Second, staff feels empowered and is therefore more likely to engage in an open discourse regarding problem areas in the future, avoiding departmental stagnation and the perpetuation of a bureaucratic hierarchy that doesn't serve the needs of the organization.

Lessons Learned

Allowing for an open discourse regarding those areas of the department that could be improved upon has many advantages. However, one major disadvantage is that not all of the concerns that are voiced can necessarily be addressed in a policy format. When initiating a transition team and the subsequent focus groups, it is important to put the emphasis on the need for transparent, honest, and open dialog about potential problems, and to highlight that communication process as the major positive benefit of the focus group initiative. Simply being able to voice a concern in a consequence-free environment of a focus group can be important to employee perceptions of change, regardless of how much change results from the focus meetings.

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY

Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice (IRJ) served as the external evaluator of integrity efforts at the Boston Police Department. IRJ is currently housed at the College of Criminal Justice but is a collaborative effort amongst the College of Criminal Justice, the College of Arts and Sciences, and the law school at Northeastern. The Institute's mission is to utilize strategic social science research methodologies to assist government agencies, educational institutions, and community stakeholders in the development of policy changes to advance the cause of social justice. The Institute was founded on the premise that academic institutions can work with communities to provide rigorous and objective information that can be used to influence policy changes that advance the cause of social justice. This research model attempts to enhance scientific inquiries with the input and experiences of community stakeholders who struggle with issues of racial injustice. The coupling of community practitioners and social scientists allows practitioners access to academic input while providing academics with more current and salient ideas about and data on issues in the field.[7]

[7] More information about the Institute on Race and Justice can be found at www.irj.neu.edu/

The complete report published by Northeastern University's IRJ is being submitted under separate cover; however, the Executive Summary, Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion can be found in the Appendix.

CONCLUSION

By eschewing the "bad apple" or individualistic approach to enhancing organizational integrity and instead focusing on enhancing routine policing processes to more accurately reflect the organization's values and focus on integrity through implementation of the five ECI strategies selected, BPD has put itself in the forefront of thinking in this arena. While implementation of all of the strategies during the grant period involved some sort of evolution from their initial focus, both collectively and individually, work on these strategies has had a positive impact on the climate and culture of the organization. By not only planning and implementing these strategies but also publicly embracing the need for continual focus on departmental integrity and accountability, the department has emboldened the community's trust and therein enhanced all of the department's many community policing initiatives.

Despite all of the successes during the grant period, the BPD has also faced an increasing crime rate during this time as well as other significant challenges relating to large scale events, such as the spontaneous, celebratory rioting in October 2004 following the completion of baseball's American League Championship Series. A college student was accidentally shot and killed by an officer using a pepper pellet gun for crowd control during this event. An independent commission investigating the incident determined that officers had been properly trained in how to use the technology, but not in what situations. The commission also said that the technology of such weapons, including stun guns and beanbag guns, has outpaced police departments' policies, training, and tactics. Until the BPD has tailored its training and polices for each kind of weapon, the commissioner has prohibited their use. All of these challenging circumstances detracted from the command staff's ability to advance prevention-related initiatives. Developing mechanisms to maintain momentum on training and community-based, prevention-related initiatives during these hectic, response-driven periods remains an ongoing challenge for departments across the country, and BPD is certainly no exception.

We look forward to continued partnership with the COPS Office and the other divisions at the Department of Justice as we pursue answers and solutions to these challenges. Thank you for your support of our efforts to date.

APPENDIX

Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice (IRJ) was the external evaluator for the Boston Police Department. IRJ submitted its findings under a separate cover; however, here are the Executive Summary, Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion from that report.

Enhancing Citizen Participation in the Review of Complaints and Use of Force in the Boston Police Department

by Dean Jack McDevitt, Dr. Amy Farrell, Dr. W. Carsten Andresen,
with assistance from Lisa Bailey-Laguerre

Institute on Race and Justice, Northeastern University

December 2005

Executive Summary

Law enforcement agencies across the county have faced increasing public concern about the openness and transparency of their internal review processes. In response to these concerns, numerous agencies have voluntarily agreed to allow individuals external to the department the opportunity to review internal records about use of force incidents and citizen complaints. In fact, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 79 percent of those police agencies with 1,000 or more officers now have civilian complaint review processes in place in their agencies.[8] Conversely, many agencies resistant to external review have been forced to turn the investigative authority of their departments over to an external body. Without argument, civilian oversight and review of misconduct complaints and use of force incident investigations has become a standard practice for agencies concerned about public accountability.

8 Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Law Enforcement Management Survey*, 2005.

In 2003, the Boston Police Department (BPD) was selected by the Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) as one of four agencies in the United States to receive funding to enhance integrity within the department. The BPD allocated part of this funding to better understand and improve civilian oversight in the complaint review process. Civilian oversight is not a new issue facing the BPD. In 1992, the department established a Community Appeals Board to review appeals from citizens who were unsatisfied with the outcome of their complaint. Unfortunately, since the late 1990s, the board has become nonfunctional. To help remedy these shortcomings, the department partnered with Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice (IRJ) to examine the best practices for civilian oversight nationally and evaluate the strengths and challenges of the current complaint process in Boston. During the project, issues about civilian oversight of use of force incidents emerged and were added to the project.

This project was designed to both understand the best practices of complaint and use of force review nationally and to recommend a model of civilian oversight that would meet the specific oversight needs within Boston. Case studies were conducted to identify the best practices for civilian review using various review structures in law enforcement agencies throughout the county. In addition to the national assessment, surveys, focus groups, and interviews with local stakeholders identified the strengths and limitations of previous review processes in Boston.

Findings

Although there are many different models for review used throughout the county, a common set of principles appears to help make models successful regardless of the specific review structure. From the site visits and in-depth analysis of civilian review models nationally, we have identified six key principles.

SIX KEY PRINCIPLES:

1. The community has a role in complaint review and oversight.
2. Fully external investigations are complex and costly.
3. Strong civilian oversight models increase communication with the public.
4. Oversight works best when it is triggered automatically.
5. Oversight should be transparent.
6. There is no one best model—models must fit the local needs, structure, and history.

In addition to identifying key principles that guide the development of a new oversight process, we conducted surveys of police and community members and held focus groups and interviews with local stakeholders to identify specific successes and challenges that shape the type of review model that would most appropriately meet the needs of the Boston community. Some of the key findings are outlined below.

LOCAL SUCCESSES:

- The BPD has a high rate of sustained complaints in its investigations.
- Use of force, including both lethal and nonlethal force, by BPD officers is low compared with other departments of similar sizes and those that serve similar cities.
- The BPD has a proven track record working with groups outside the department to identify the priorities of the community and work toward meeting common goals.

LOCAL CHALLENGES:

- Generally limited community involvement in police misconduct oversight
- Inadequate communication about the investigative process and status of complaints
- Insufficient access points to file complaints
- Low trust and confidence in the investigation process, particularly among certain groups with historically poor police relationships
- Numerous questions about whether appropriate techniques are used in the investigative process, particularly when dealing with vulnerable populations.

Recommendations

Based on the findings from both the national assessment of best practices and the local evaluation of needs in Boston, we offer three main recommendations:

1. Expand the options for resolving complaints by developing a complaint mediation program.
2. Improve communication with the community about the complaint review process and with those who file complaints the status of the complaint investigation.
3. Implement an external review process for complaint and use of force investigations.

Recommendation 1: *Improve Citizen Complaint Processes Through Mediation*

The department should offer mediation as an alternative to official complaints when both sides agree to mediation. Across the county, departments have found that mediation has the potential to help remedy bad feelings that may exist between officers and citizen following an encounter. To be effective, mediation sessions must be led by a formally trained mediator. We recommend that during the first year in operation, the BPD should develop and implement a mediation program.

Recommendation 2: *Improve Communication and Access to the BPD Internal Affairs Division (IAD).*

To overcome community concerns about the difficulty civilians face in filing a complaint, we recommend that the department:

- Develop alternative avenues for filing complaints. The department could create alternative complaint reporting locations with local service providers and advocacy groups.
- Improve outreach and education about the complaint reporting process through community engagement
- Enhance communication to complainants and police officers once complaints have been filed by providing more regularized updates about the status of investigations. New case management software may be necessary to help the department improve communication.

Recommendation 3: *Adopt a New Model for Complaint and Use of Force Review*

We recommend the adoption of a 3-tiered Community Monitoring and Review Process to review complaints and use of force incidents. This model is described in more detail below.

COMMUNITY MONITORING AND REVIEW PROCESS

First Tier: *Internal Investigation*

- Boston Police Department IAD conducts investigation on all citizen complaints and use of force reports through the normal investigative process.
- Sustained complaints and unjustified use of force incidents would be forwarded to the police commissioner through normal channels for final disposition.

Second Tier: *Professional Ombudsperson*

- A professional ombudsperson, reporting to the mayor, reviews all cases where the IAD has not sustained an external citizen complaint or has found use of force incidents to be justified. Additionally, the ombudsperson reviews a random set of all complaints to ensure integrity in the investigative process.

Role:

- The ombudsperson provides professional oversight of IAD, helping to assure the community that all investigations are thorough and fair.
- The ombudsperson must have unfettered access to all investigative files and departmental information pertinent to reviewing incident including tapes, transcripts, notes, and witness statements.
- The ombudsperson has ability to receive complaints (which will be forwarded to BPD IAD) and conduct outreach to citizens of Boston.

Outcome:

- If the ombudsperson is unsatisfied with the completeness or accuracy of the investigation, the incidents will be returned to the Department's IAD for additional investigation.
- In cases where the Ombudsperson disagrees with the conclusions of the IAD following further investigation, they can provide a separate recommendation to the police commissioner.
- Reviews BPD Policy and Procedures, which may contribute to police misconduct and provide public reports on the integrity of the department's complaint and use of force investigations.

Third Tier: *Civilian-Police Review Panels*

- The ombudsperson forwards all nonsustained external complaints or justified use of force investigations that rise above a designated threshold of severity to civilian-police review panels.

Role:

- The civilian-police panels provide additional oversight of IAD investigations for the most serious cases, helping to ensure all investigations are thorough and fair.
- The civilian-police review panels would be comprised of three civilians, two peer officers and one commanding officer. Each panel will be drawn from a pool of civilian and police reviewers.
- Panels must have unfettered access to all investigative files and departmental information pertinent to reviewing the incident, including tapes, transcripts, notes, and witness statements.

Outcome:

- If the panel is unsatisfied with the completeness or accuracy of the investigation, the complaint or use of force incident will be returned to the department's IAD for additional investigation.
- In cases where the civilian-police panel disagrees with the conclusions of IAD, it can provide a separate recommendation to the police commissioner.

Under this model, BPD retains responsibility for investigating complaints and use of force incidents, but is held accountable by both a professional monitor and community-police panels. The following diagram illustrates the flow of review for all cases in both the current process and the new proposed review process.

The recommendations in this report are meant to be a starting point for developing a new civilian review model. To help ensure the model works most effectively, we propose the development of a selection committee with representation from a broad spectrum of stakeholders in Boston to advise the city in the hiring of the ombudsperson and to provide an annual review of the process to identify other steps that need to be taken to ensure accountability.

Figure A1. Flowchart of Process for Complaint Review, Current Model.



Figure A2. Flowchart of Process for Complaint Review, New Model.



Figure A3. Steps in Police Examination Application and Hiring Process.



Figure A3. Steps in Police Examination Application and Hiring Process *(continued).*

Source: Strategic Change Consortium, February, 2007

CONCLUSION

The development of a broad-based civilian oversight process will take courage by the leadership of Boston and the Boston Police Department. Some may criticize the recommendations in this report as intrusive and unnecessary, while others will claim they do not go far enough. Additionally, some may question why the city should invest resources in the development of a civilian oversight system when violence is increasing and the capacity of the police department is strained. While we fully support the police commissioner's request for increased staffing to build the department back to the levels of the 1990s, it is crucial to increase the accountability and transparency of the department during these times of heightened neighborhood level violence. As officers increasingly confront gun violence and step up efforts to apprehend suspects in the community, the chance of alleged unjustified force or other misconduct increases. Without a transparent civilian oversight model in place to help ensure that all complaints are investigated thoroughly and fairly, the department risks losing legitimacy in the community, particularly in high-crime neighborhoods where trust and confidence are most critical to effective policing.

The development of a strong form of civilian oversight is the next phase in the development of the BPD. We believe these steps will help ensure accountability and transparency and place the BPD in line with the nationally accepted best practices for civilian oversight.

In this Technical Guide, the Boston Police Department explores seven strategies to strengthen its integrity and accountability to its officers and the public. This project, facilitated through an Enhancing Cultures of Integrity grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, reaffirms the importance of community policing as a premier crime-fighting philosophy. We hope law agencies will find this report useful in their efforts to improve their service to the communities they are sworn to protect and serve.

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